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Establishing American Trading Companies
Franklin A. Cole*
On September 3, 1980, the United States Senate, by unanimous
vote, passed landmark legislation designed to increase American ex-
ports of products and services by encouraging formation of U.S. export
trading companies.' The Export Trading Company Act of 1980,2 rein-
troduced and at this writing awaiting approval by a new Congress, 3 is a
significant first step in offering American companies, particularly those
of small and medium size, the opportunity to enter markets on a par
* Chairman of the Board, Walter E. Heller International Corporation; B.S., University of
Illinois, 1947; J.D., Northwestern University, 1950. The author acknowledges with gratitude the
help over many years of Harvey S. Lederman, Vice President, Marketing and Public Relations of
Walter E. Heller & Company; Charles A. Brizzolara, Vice President, Secretary and General
Counsel of Walter E. Heller International Corporation; and Burton R. Abrahams, President of
Walter E. Heller Overseas Corporation, in trying to impress upon Congress and regulators the
need to provide the means to enable small and medium size firms to export, and the vast potential
inherent in that activity.
1 The Senate vote was 77-0. [1980] 323 INT'L TRADE RaT. U.S. EXPORT WKLY. (BNA) at C-
I.
2 S. 2718, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). "The purpose of this Act is to increase United States
exports of products and services, particularly by small, medium-sized and minority concerns, by
encouraging more efficient provision of export trade services to American producers and suppli-
ers." 126 CONG. REc. Si,935 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1980).
3 The Export Trading Company Act of 1981, S. 144, which is almost identical to S. 2718, was
introduced on January 19, 1981, with the co-sponsorship of 49 U.S. senators. [1980] 342 INT'L
TRADE RPT. U.S. EXPORT WKLY. (BNA) at C-5. Three separate bills have been introduced in the
House: H.R. 1799, H.R. 1321, and H.R. 1648. [1980] 344 INt'L TRADE RPT. U.S. EXPORT WKLY.
(BNA) at C-6.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:277(1980)
with their international foreign competitors. The Act moderates re-
strictions that have blocked the growth of full-range export trade ser-
vice companies that would help average-sized firms enter international
markets. The effectiveness of the all-encompassing "one-stop" service
organization is indicated by the success of the general trading compa-
nies of Japan. American export trading companies, organized to meet
the needs of our own economy, could help to resolve the problems and
business-related fears that have inhibited the average American manu-
facturer from international trade. While the Act is no panacea, it
would promote the development of our export strength, and put us in a
better position for the future. Its swift enactment should be supported.
After a brief review of the United States export balance, this arti-
cle will explore the operation of the Japanese general trading compa-
nies, which have aroused interest in the American business community
and have been proposed as a partial model for our own export trade.4
The provisions of the Export Trading Company Act of 1980 will then
be examined to assess Congress' approach to the formation of export
trading companies in the United States.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF AMERICA'S EXPORT TRADE
The American trade deficit in 1979 was $24.7 billion.5 Although
monthly figures in the first half of 1980 were favorable, and although
the annual deficit may not have increased in 1980, this is still a sizable
amount. Data from the U.S. Commerce Department shows that since
1978, we have begun to regain the share of free world exports we lost
during the years 1970-77--that is, from our 1977 low of 12% we have
come up to 12.5%.6 It is clear, however, that further improvement is
needed. Growth in American exports has helped, among other things,
to pay a tremendous oil bill, and has prevented a trade deficit that
could have been twice as large.7 We need to strengthen our new trend
4 Export Trading Companies and Trade Associations: Hearings on S. 864, S. 1499, S. 1633, and
S. 1744 Before the Subcomm on Int'l Finance ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1979) (statement of Frederick W. Huszagh, Executive Director,
Dean Rusk Center, University of Georgia) [hereinafter cited as S. 864 Hearings]; see Financial
Institutions and Export Trading Companies- Hearings on S. 2718 Before the Senate Comma on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980) (statement of Sen. Stevenson)
[hereinafter cited as S. 2718 Hearings].
5 N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1980, at 19, col. 1.
6 Bus. WEEK, Jan. 26, 1981, at 115. Even the improvement in the U.S. market share may be
overstated, due to devaluation of the dollar during the 1970's, with the unit value of U.S. exports
lessening as a result. Id. July 21, 1980, at 90.
7 Estimates for 1980 show that earnings of above $27 billion in agricultural goods and $26
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of export growth. America's small and medium sized manufacturing
firms represent an untapped source of business energy.
With the exception of giant corporations, and manufacturers in
certain specialty lines, U.S. manufacturers on the whole are not export-
minded. It is not difficult to understand why. For most of the nation's
history, domestic demand has engaged average-sized firms to the exclu-
sion of investigating foreign markets.' After World War II, as interna-
tional trade began to grow, it fit into the established marketing patterns
of only the largest U.S. firms. Today a tiny fraction of American man-
ufacturers have any regular export practice-8.3% of 300,000 firms, ac-
cording to recent data from the International Trade Administration.9
Small and medium sized firms are deterred from entering the ex-
port business by more than habit and the historical pre-emption of the
larger firms. The average firm has neither tremendous financial
strength nor intimate knowledge of foreign business, and it fears the
risks of credit and collection. t0 International trade involves serious cost
and inconvenience in handling red tape. One study found that 828 mil-
lion documents, and 6.5 billion copies were used in U.S. international
trade each year." Locating and analyzing foreign markets,' 2 and ar-
billion in manufactured goods will offset our fuel bill deficit of $72 billion enough to leave a
balance-of-trade deficit of only $25 billion. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 3, at 1, col. I.
8 In 1970, the Research Department of Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp. performed a survey, "In-
ternational Activities of 455 Commercial Banks with Deposits of from $10 million to $500 mil-
lion" (April 15, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Heller Research Survey]. In answer to the question of
why manufacturers, the customers of these banks, were not exporting the management considera-
tion most frequently cited was "too busy with domestic sales" (91 mentions). The next most fre-
quently cited reason was "lack of vision on the part of management" (61 mentions) (copy of this
survey is on file at the offices of the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business). A
more recent study of 162 firms reported similar results: e.g., among firms of 11-20 years' experi-
ence, and firms of over 40 years' experience, "complacent and domestic-oriented firms" was given
as the second-largest impediment to export (the largest was government regulations). Jones,
Clearing the Wayfor Exporters, Bus. HORIZONS, Oct. 1980, at 26, 28.
9 Data from the International Trade Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1980, as re-
viewed in the White House Commission on Small Business April 1980 Report to the President,
show that only 8.3% of the nation's 300,000 manufacturers export regularly, and that only about
1,900 of these firms account for 84% of U.S. exports. The report goes on to say, "In [U.S. Depart-
ment of] Commerce's view, at least 20,000 small companies that are not exporting now could
easily sell their products overseas." Id. at 1.
10 Heller Research Survey, supra note 8, at 10; Jones, supra note 8, at 28,30.
11 International trade involves the use of
125 different types of documents; 1000 different forms are in regular and special use, with the
average shipment involving 46 separate documents; 828 million documents and 6.5 billion
copies are used annually in U.S. international trade; the average documentation cost per
export shipment is $375, and $320 for imports; and documentation costs for all U.S. exports
and imports totals almost... 7.5 per cent of the value of the shipments.
Study by the Nat'l Comm. on Int'l Trade Documentation, cited in Mullen, Export Promotiox •
Legal and Structural Limtations on a Broad United States Commitment, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
279
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ranging effective foreign sales representation,13 present two further dis-
couraging problems. In the face of these obstacles, it is not surprising
to find the mass of small and medium sized firms appearing to export
by chance, if at all. 4
The federal government might be supposed to have mitigated
these problems with an effective policy of export incentives. But it has
not. The chief tax incentive in this field is the Domestic International
Sales Corporation (DISC) program,' 5 which has been severely criti-
cized. 16 At best, the U.S. tax incentive program has been described as
"not being designed to aid the expansion of exports. . . intended to be
neutral; that is, to neither help nor hinder exporting."' 7 The main fed-
eral export credit vehicle is the Export-Import Bank, which was
designed to help expand exports,' but its effectiveness is also uncer-
tain. The Treasury remains optimistic about the merits of Eximbank
trade support,19 but at the very least, heavy extension of government
credit tends to distort private investment decisions, cannot provide im-
portant business leadership, and is not likely to solve the average firm's
problems of lack of know-how and lack of capacity to handle red tape.
GENERAL TRADING COMPANIES-THE JAPANESE MODEL
There is a model of trade growth whose successes appear strikingly
to match some of our needs. That model is a form of enterprise within
the economy of Japan, the sogo shosha or "general trading company."
Japan, one of the most populous countries in the world. and terribly
poor in natural resources,20 had to become a trading expert in order to
Bus. 57, 74-75 (1975). Mullen is not persuaded of the accuracy of these statistics, but notes that
they are cited repeatedly throughout the Government and the exporting community.
12 S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 82-83 (statement of Douglas R. Stucky).
13 Heller Research Survey, supra note 8, at 10; Jones, supra note 8, at 28, 30.
14 Id.
15 S. 864 Hearings, supra note 4, at 296 (report by George D. Holliday).
16 Eg. S. 864 Hearings, supra note 4, at 257 (statement of Harvey Kapnick, Chairman, Arthur
Andersen & Co.). "MW]e prepared a 30-page list for our people to use in determining whether a
particular company has problems qualifying as a DISC or not. Obviously, a small- or medium-
size company can't begin to deal with that complexity." Id.
17 H.L. WEISBERG & C. RAUCH, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXPORT INCENTIVES IN THE
UNITED STATES, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM: GERMANY AND JAPAN 48 (1970) (published by
International Division, Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
18 S. 864 Hearings, supra note 4, at 298 (report by George D. Holliday).
19 S. 864 Hearings, supra note 4, at 34-35 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten).
20 In 1977, Japan imported 99.7% of her petroleum, 76.6% of her coal, 73.0% of her natural
gas, 98.8% of her iron ore, 92.8% of her copper, 100% of her lumber, 100% of her wool and cotton,
96.0% of her wheat, 97.0% of her soybeans. JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (JETRO),
THE ROLE OF TRADING COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 21 (1980).
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survive at all. To get vital raw materials, Japan had to import; to pay
for imports, Japan had to export. Where in America the work of trade
is done largely by manufacturers, in Japan it is carried on largely
through import-export firms classified as trading companies. In fiscal
1979, trading companies accounted for 54.5% of Japan's imports and
48.2% of her exports.E' There are some 8,000 trading companies in Ja-
pan, many specializing in particular industries or products, such as
food products, textiles, or machinery; nine of them are large enough,
and general enough to be called "sogo shosha."22
Existing U.S. export management companies are generally quite
small and lack the resources to provide a range of export services to
small and medium sized manufacturing firms.2 3 In contrast, the sogo
shosha are large international trade service experts and do a remarka-
bly wide range of work. Not themselves manufacturers, they facilitate
the trade of thousands of products-from missiles to instant noodles.
As trade intermediaries, the sogo shosha provide financial services,
business information, and auxiliary international trade services such as
documentation, insurance, warehousing, and transportation, which
they have learned to do efficiently and at a low cost.2 4 Some of their
customers are large, but many are average-sized firms who could not
easily afford to provide these services for themselves.25
The core business of the sogo is trade, principally in foodstuffs,
textiles, metals and machinery, and chemicals.26 Once concerned pri-
21 Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1980, at 48, col. 1.
22 JETRO, supra note 20, at 6-8. In order of sales volume, the nine sogo shosha are Mitsub-
ishi, Mitsui, C. Itoh & Co., Marubeni, Sumitomo, Missho-Iwai, Toyo Menka Kaisha (Tomen),
Kanematsu-Gosho, and Michimen. In 1977, a tenth firm, Ataka, merged with C. Itoh, pushing the
latter into third place ahead of its long-time rival, Marubeni.
Unfortunately, there are still few useful studies in English on the sogo shosha. I shall refer
mainly to YOUNG, THE SoGo SHOSHA: JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES (1979).
Marubeni has published MARTIN, THE UNIQUE WORLD OF THE SOGO SHOsHA (1978). Seegener-
ally, ROSERTS & MITSUI: THREE CENTURIES OF JAPANESE BUSINESS (1973); ASIA'S NEw GIANT:
How THE JAPANESE EcONOMY WORs (Patrick & Roskovsky, eds. 1976); BUSINESS IN JAPAN
(Norbury & Bownas, eds., 1974); NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY (1970) (short, insightful ethno-
graphic study); YANAGA, BIG BUSINESS IN JAPANESE POLrrIcs (1968) (political science).
23 Barovick, Expanding the Role of Export Trading Companies, Bus. AMERICA, April 21, 1980,
at 11.
24 YOUNG, supra note 22, at 57-68.
25 Id. at 138-42.
26 In fiscal year 1975, the sogo shosha carried 47% of Japan's exports of machinery (56% of her
export foreign trade), 82% of her metal exports (21%), 61% of her textile exports (6.8%), 65% of her
chemical exports (6.4%), 100% of foodstuff exports (1.4%); 54% of her imports of mineral fuel and
metal raw materials (52% of her import foreign trade), 81% of her foodstuff imports (16%), 42% of
her machinery imports (7.2%), 74% of her textile exports (4.4%), and 18% of her chemical product
imports (3.7%). YOUNG, supra note 22, at 7.
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marily with sales into the Japanese domestic market,27 as the sogo
shosha matured they began to develop more sophisticated trading prac-
tices: two-way trade, for example, buying iron ore from a foreign min-
ing company and selling Japanese mining and transportation
equipment in return; barter trade, exchanges of goods for goods with-
out currency; "switch" trade, in which imports from one foreign coun-
try are paid for in the goods or currency of another;28 and offshore or
third-country trade, in which neither the supplier nor the market is in
Japan. One sogo shosha was asked for polyester fibers by a Brazilian
textile maker. The sogo shosha went to a large American chemical
company, which was willing to supply the fibers but was short of an
essential raw material, ethylene glycol. A French firm was willing to
supply the ethylene glycol, but only if it could get benzene. The sogo
shosha procured benzene from firms in the U.S. and Holland, the
French firm produced the ethylene glycol, and the American textile
maker was finally able to provide the polyester fibers for the textile
manufacturer in Brazil. This transaction, illustrating the trading prac-
tices of the sogo shosha and their match-making skill with producers
and suppliers, involved five trading company offices in four countries.
It was concluded in one week.29
As the sogo shosha's international trading activity grew more ex-
tensive and more sophisticated, they developed global communications
networks, which have become their hallmark. In 1978, each of the six
largest sogo shosha had from 100 to 130 overseas offices, with the
smallest of the nine, Nichimen, maintaining "only" 86.30 Nissho-Iwai,
for example, the sixth in rank by sales, in the U.S. alone has offices in
New York, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Atlanta, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Portland, Seattle, and Anchorage, a more extensive U.S.
27 Id. at 86-89; MARTIN, supra note 22, at 4-10.
28 See, e.g., importing precision machinery from West Germany with Indonesian currency as
the currency of settlement so as to reduce the Indonesia-Japan trade deficit. YOUNG, supra note
22, at 11. "Two-way" trade, barter, and "switch" trade are sometimes collectively called counter-
trade. In countertrade agreements the seller of industrial products or technology often agrees to
purchase goods produced by his equipment or technology (a "buy-back"), or agrees to purchase
other goods produced by the buyer ("counter-purchase") representing in value a significant por-
tion of the amount due for the industrial products or technology. See Weigand, Apricotsfor,4m-
monia. Barter, Clearing, Switching, and Compensation in International Business, 22 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 33 (Fall 79); Walt, Countertrde Gains Popularity as International Trade Tool, Bus.
AMERICA, July 14, 1980, at 12-16.
29 YOUNG, supra note 22, at 11. In fiscal year 1976, the combined offshore trade of the sogo
shosha was $15.4 billion. See id. at 197-202; JETRO, supra note 20, at 23-25; BUSINESS IN JAPAN,
supra note 22, at 177.
30 U.S.-Japan Trade Council, Report No. 31, Japan's Sogo Shosha, at 12 (Sept. 28, 1979).
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network than operated by many middle-sized American firms.31 Dur-
ing fiscal 1976, the top six sogo shosha spent Y57.5 billion (about $192
million) on communications expenses.32 The enormous amount of
business intelligence that they collect is disseminated, usually free of
charge, to their customers.33 Such a service is greatly appreciated by
the customers, and secures for the sogo shosha a continuing working
relationship which also yields further business insights.
Though they are not bankers, the sogo shosha have also developed
financial business. 34 They supply credit, loans, and loan guarantees to
their customers, serving as risk-absorbing intermediaries between their
trade customers and the commercial banks. Sogo shosha take long-
term notes and deferred payments from customers for sales of com-
modities, and issue short-term bills or make advance payments to sup-
pliers for purchasers. Ther six largest sogo shosha carried 34% of the
total commercial credit extended by Japan's major corporations (452
firms) for the entire fiscal year ending March 31, 1974.35 Sogo shosha
make short-term loans for operating expenses, and long-term loans for
purchasing equipment, plant construction and even real estate. They
borrow heavily from the large commercial banks and lend small sums
(though some loans are substantial) to thousands of small and medium
sized producers. 36 They are in an excellent position to do this. The
huge flow of business information available to the sogo shosha, plus the
intimate knowledge of their customers acquired by working on a day-
to-day basis to perform documentation, insurance, transport, and coor-
dination and management services, enable the sogo shosha to make de-
tailed and realistic assessments of the risks of lending and giving
credit.37 From the customer's point of view, finance is another service
available from the sogo shosha with which they already deal and are on
31 YOUNG, supra note 22, at 74-75.
32 By late 1973, Mitsui was employing three computers in Tokyo, London, and New York to
control a system of telex lines, telegraph, and privately leased data channels, in which the private
channels alone carried some 20,000 messages a day to 44 offices in Japan and 112 offices overseas.
YOUNG, supra note 22, at 77-79. (Mitsui had 130 overseas offices in 1978). On one day in 1977,
the Tokyo office of Mitsubishi: received 144 international telephone calls and made 72; received
30,000 domestic telephone calls, 30,000 intercom calls, and made 35,000; received 4,260 copies of
subscription newspapers; received 15,600 pieces of mail (10,000 from overseas) and sent out 19,000
(10,000 overseas); received 17,000 telexes, and sent 22,000. Mitsubishi operates 450,000 kilometers
of telex lines, the equivalent of 11 times around the globe. U.S.-Japan Trade Council Report,
supra note 30, at 8.
33 YOUNG, supra note 22, at 67.
34 Id. at 58-60; MARTiN, supra note 22, at 21-23.
35 YOUNG, supra note 22, at 56-68.
36 Id. at 62.
37 Id. at 140-42.
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good terms. From the banker's point of view, the size and diversity of
the sogo shosha make them good loan customers; and, with the sogo
shosha as knowledgeable intermediaries to smaller businesses, the
banks' risk is much reduced.3
8
Building on a base of closely-tailored import and export trade, the
sogo shosha have become advisors, organizers, and catalysts in Japan's
economic development, participating in Japan's growing business of
exporting industrial plants,39 in overseas natural-resource development
projects, and in the creation of huge receiving-fabricating-distributing
complexes or "combinats." By the summer of 1972, the sogo shosha
along with five steel wholesalers had built over 200 steel centers in Ja-
pan. These centers stocked steel-mill inventories, provided shearing,
sawing, and grinding to specifications, made deliveries, and offered the
usual information and finance services.40 The success of the steel cen-
ters led to more and larger ventures in other products, including food-
stuffs.
4 1
38 But see Hoshii, Japan's Banking and Investment Systems, in BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note
22, at 49,71-72; ADAMs & HosHiI, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE NEW JAPAN 434-37 (1972). Dr.
Hoshii complains that sogo shosha may be forced to suffer losses on liquidating collateral such as
warehouse receipts and bills of lading, and that their very attention to smaller firms, and intimate
involvement with clients, inhibit the traders from cutting off credit as a bank would when risk
grows too high. This concern was sounded in Japan particularly in the early 1970s after the so-
called "Nixon shocks" affecting dollar-yen exchange. See The "Trading Companies" columns for
the early 1970s in Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), INDUSTRIAL REVIEW OF
JAPAN (published annually).
39 For example, the $7.3 million sale by Sumitomo of a Du Pont magnetic-powder factory to
the U.S.S.R. in 1975. Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1980, at 48, col. 1. In 1976 the value of Japanese plant
exports was $6.5 billion. MARTIN, supra note 22, at 25-27; see YOUNG, supra note 22, at 203-04.
40 YOUNG, supra note 22, at 136-38; JETRO, supra note 20, at 15.
41 JETRO, supra note 20, at 21-23. Marubei has a six-acre lumber center near Tokyo, hous-
ing twenty lumber wholesalers and a sawmill. MARTIN, supra note 22, at 17. On a much larger
scale is the 23-hectare Konan food combinat (about 57 acres) organized by Mitsui at Kobe harbor,
with facilities for berthing cargoes of up to 60,000 tons, and with conveyors, pipelines, silos, refrig-
eration, first- and second-stage processing, and wholesale and retail distribution all on the site.
Konan Pier, and the Konan Utility Co. (in which all the processors have equity participation), are
Mitsui subsidiaries. Professor Young considers the development of combinats tantamount to or-
ganization of a new industry. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 110-12.
In natural-resources development, Mitsubishi is the chief organizer of one of the world's larg-
est natural gas projects off the shore of Brunei on the island of Borneo, with 45% participation by
Mitsubishi, 45% by Royal Dutch Shell, and 10% by the Brunei government. Mitsubishi did the
feasibility and technical studies, carried out the negotiations, built a liquefaction plant, and con-
structed unloading bases in Japan. Seven tankers, each with a capacity for 32,000 tons of liquid
natural gas and chartered by Mitsubishi at a rate of five million tons a year, transport the gas 4,500
kilometers from Borneo to Japan. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 159.
It should be recalled that Mitsubishi, the largest sogo shosha, had a total sales volume of $55
billion in fiscal 1979, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1980, at 48, col. I, some five times the sales of the
smallest sogo shosha, and ten times the sales of the largest non-Japanese trading company,
Kooperativa Forbundet of Sweden. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 17-18, 25-26. Young finds that the
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For the most part, the sogo shosha of today do not predate World
War I.42 In the late 1940's, some of the traders that until then had
been fairly specialized began to increase their trading volume and the
scope of their business. In this, they were helped by several of the prin-
cipal banks, who were able to offer capital and leadership at a time
when both were in short supply.43 A new configuration began to form
in the Japanese business community: "enterprise groups" (keiretsu),
associations of firms whose members tended to cooperate with each
other and to compete with firms outside, but without the subordination
to vertical control that had characterized the pre-war conglomerates.44
The banks were often the financial nuclei of these looser, more fluid
groups, and the trading companies, as they took on the purchase, sale,
and sometimes the distribution of products manufactured by other
group members, broadened in range both geographically and in prod-
uct variety, maturing into true general traders--sogo shosha.45 In the
last few years, group members have continued to rely upon each other
in business relations, but not exclusively. During fiscal 1973, firms in
the six largest groups transacted an average of ten to thirty percent of
their total purchases and sales with the sogo shosha in their group. 6
huge capital requirements and high risks of natural resources development have so far put most of
such projects on a basis more like Marubeni's Dampier Salt venture, an 11,800-hectare salt field in
Western Australia developed in 1969-71, with 21% participation by Marubeni, and 11% by
Nissho-Iwai, at a cost of about $25 million. See also MARTIN, supra note 22, at 72-76. In this
pattern, where rival trading companies join as joint venture partners, with non-Japanese concerns
also involved, the sogo shosha can jockey for market power with each other and also keep an eye
on the operational methods of their rivals. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 155-57. The long-term
planning of projects such as Dampier Salt, or the Brunei natural gas development (which took six
years), is another strength of the sogo shosha. U.S.-Japan Trade Council Report, supra note 30, at
6.
42 Although trading companies in the broad sense were formed as early as the Meiji era in the
second half of the nineteenth century, only Mitsui and Mitsubishi had developed a general
enough trading business before World War II to be comparable to the sogo shosha of today. See,
e.g., YOUNG, supra note 22, at 31-37.
43 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 22, at 35-36; ROBERTS, supra note 22, at 394-95.
4 4 YANAGA, supra note 22, at 32-40; Lockwood, Japan's "New Capitalism," in THE STATE AND
ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 447,495-98 (Lockwood ed. 1965); YOUNG, supra note 22, at 36-
38, 48-51. Roberts is more cynical of the similarity between the keiretsu and the prewar order,
ROBERTS, supra note 22, at 408-28, but Prof. Yanaga, who wrote the preface to the Roberts book
believes that "the present setup is very different from the setup before the war in spirit, structure,
and operation." YANAGA, supra note 22, at 39.
45 BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 22, at 160-64; MARTIN, supra note 22, at 33-36; YOUNG,
supra note 22, at 37, 48, 83-144.
46 Sales of the sixty-five firms in the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo groups to their sogo
shosha amounted to approximately 20% of the sogo shosha's purchases. About 5-6% of the three
sogo shosha's sales was purchased by their group firms. (The other firms were more dependent
upon the sogo shosha than vice versa.) Sales and purchases transacted with their sogo shosha
made up about 30% of the sixty-five firms' total sales and purchases. For the remaining six sogo
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Financial arrangements have followed a similar pattern, with the firms
looking to group financial institutions for about twenty percent of the
borrowing needs of "their" sogo shosha.47
The sogo shosha have clearly been a main force in Japan's ex-
traordinary export success. Their development of overseas markets,
and their management of trade functions, have enabled Japanese man-
ufacturers to put more capital into improving plants and products.
Their extension of information, administrative services, and knowl-
edgeable credit have helped small and medium sized firms in particular
to participate effectively in international trade, to the great benefit of
Japan. As a method of organizing commercial enterprise, the general
trading company-large, diversified, flexible, mastering a great flow of
information and expert at arranging international transactions, backed
by the resources of major banks and able to stand as an intermediary
where they cannot-has a number of virtues from the point of view of
American international trade.
CURRENT BARRIERS TO THE FORMATION OF U.S.
EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES
It seems fair to say that the sogo shosha model could not be fol-
lowed identically in the United States, for a number of reasons, some
having to do with the normal practices of American manufacturers,48
and some having to do with the degree to which the sogo shosha's
shosha, and the 122 firms in the groups to which they belong, the relationship is rather weaker,
accounting for some 10% of the total sales and purchases of the manufacturers in these groups.
The latter six groups are those in whose assembly leading banks were most instrumental. These
figures are averages compiled by the Japan Fair Trade Commission, and do not state transaction
percentages between specific group firms and group sogo shosha. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 44-45.
47 YOUNG, supra note 22, at 42-44. For example, Mitsubishi took 14.8% of its loans from the
Mitsubishi Bank, an additional 10.5% from other Mitsubishi group institutions, and 9.5% from its
"second main bank," the Bank of Tokyo; while C. Itoh satisfied more of its borrowing needs from
the Sumitomo Bank (12.9%) than from all the financial institutions in the Da-Ichi Kangyo Bank
group (12.1%) to which C. Itoh is considered to belong. Id. at 34, 37, 39-41. See P.B. STONE,
JAPAN SURGES AHEAD 59, 164 (1969).
48 Sogo shosha are not active in products that call for after-sales service, such as automobiles,
cameras, and consumer electronics. In these lines the manufacturers do much more trading, as is
done in the U.S. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 100; U.S.-Japan Trade Council, supra note 30, at 1.
Further, sogo shosha are so highly leveraged that, in the words of even the optimistic Professor
Young, "[wiestern financiers without previous experience with the sogo shosha all shudder in
disbelief when they read the trading concerns' financial statements." Sogo shosha borrow 97% of
their total capital and operate at nearly a 1:1 assets-liabilities ratio. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 72-
74. As a banker I cannot object to Professor Young's characterization. He maintains, however,
that the sogo shosha have been operating this way since the early 1950's, id., and his data for fiscal
1976 show an average profit on equity for the nine firms of 24% and an average annual dividend
of 12%.
Establishing American Trading Companies
2:277(1980)
strength may rest on socially and culturally founded Japanese business
habits that might not be viable here.49 In addition, legal barriers, prin-
cipally in the form of U.S. banking laws and regulations, have pre-
cluded the formation of effective export trading companies in the
United States.50
U.S. banking laws and regulations issued over the last sixty years
have established and implemented a general policy of separating bank-
ing from commerce within the United States.51 Certain of these provi-
sions have restricted the ability of banking organizations from
participating in export trading companies.52 For example, Edge Act
corporations are prohibited from investing in any corporation "en-
gaged in the general business of buying or selling goods, wares, mer-
49 Any fair study of "company style" (shaft), institutionalized business entertainment (Hito no
kokoro wayoru wak-aru--"You get through to a man's soul at night"), the interplay of revealed
position (tatemae) and true intention (honne), the relationships between persons who stand as
elders (oyabun, literally "parents" and also meaning mentors/teachers/superiors) and those who
defer to them (kobun, literally "children" and also meaning prot6ges/pupils/juniors), and so on, is
beyond the scope of this short article, if not beyond the grasp of this author. However, those who
appear to understand Japan insist that these matters are of modem and crucial importance in
Japan today. See BusiNss IN JAPAN, supra note 22, at 268-87, 46-48, 88-110; YANAGA, supra
note 22, at 1-29; see generaly, NAKANE, supra note 22. One must acknowledge that manner may
be an indispensable foundation of method.
50 Many businessmen have seen another legal barrier to the formation of export trading com-
panies (ETCs) in American antitrust laws. ETCs need to deal with and represent a large number
of manufacturers. Generally, the products traded will at most be complementary, but on occasion
products may be in competition for the same foreign order. The applicability of our antitrust laws
to this situation is unclear. Title H of the Export Trading Company Act of 1980 proposes to
clarify the antitrust requirements applicable to export trade associations by revising certain lan-
guage in the Webb Pomerene Act of 1918 and by providing a certification procedure, adminis-
tered by the Department of Commerce, enabling ETCs and other such associations to receive
antitrust clearance for specified export trade activities. See S. REP. No. 735, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
13-17 (1980).
51 Though federal regulation of banking reaches back to the National Currency Act of 1863,
ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863) and beyond, federal regulation over both state and federally chartered
banking institutions properly commenced in 1913 with the formation of the Federal Reserve
Board under the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 (part I) Stat. 251 (1913). American banking regu-
lations should not be taken to be a consistent whole. "In [the regulation of banking by the federal
government], through accidents of history in conjunction with understandable human failings, a
situation exists that has never been paralleled, as far as I can ascertain, in terms of complexity,
confusion, irrationality and difficulty of administration." Robertson, Federal Regulation of Bank-
ing: A Plea for Unocation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 673, 673 (1966); see WHrrE, BANKING
LAW (1976); Chase, The Structure of Federal Regulation of Depository Institutions, in HousE
COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY & HOusING, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY (FINE), COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE FINE
STUDY 145 (Comm. Print 1976).
52 Senator Stevenson notes there are some 16 different limits on the degree to which banks and
bank holding companies can participate in trading companies. Export Trading Companies: Hear-
ings and Markup on H.A 7230 Before the Subcomm on IntlEco. Policy and Trade ofthe House
Com. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980).
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chandise or commodities in the United States."53 The Glass-Steagall
Act generally prohibits a national or state member bank from acquir-
ing for its own account "any shares of stock of any corporation."54 The
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 generally prohibits a bank hold-
ing company from engaging in non-banking activities or from owning
or controlling shares of any company that is not a bank."
The Bank Holding Company Act does make numerous exceptions
to the prohibition of "nonbanking activities." The most important ex-
ception allows bank holding companies to start or acquire non-banking
activities which are "so closely related to banking as to be a proper
incident thereto" and which produce "public benefits."56 It is within
this limited exemption that banks and bank holding companies have
served the economy outside of the traditional sphere of commercial
banking.57 While the Federal Reserve Board has found a certain range
of activities to be "closely related" to banking and thus open to invest-
ment by banking organizations,5" it is clear that banks and bank hold-
ing companies cannot engage in the purchase and sale of inventories or
in the operation of a warehouse, docking or transportation facilities,
except as a result of the acquisition and operation of such a business on
a temporary basis through foreclosure of a debt previously con-
tracted,59 or as a less than five percent equity owner of such business.60
53 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Edge Act subsidiaries can engage directly in
such international banking operations as accepting deposits from foreign parties, issuing or con-
firming letters of credit, extending loans, creating bankers' acceptances, purchasing and selling
securities, and engaging in foreign exchange trading. Edge Act subsidiaries can also make equity
investments abroad, and engage in international investment banking. 12 U.S.C. § 615(c) (1976).
54 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). Bank failures and liquidations of the early 1930's, blamed chiefly on
the agricultural depression and alleged abuses of authority by bank managements in stock market
speculation, led to the formation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) under the
Glass-Steagall Act.
55 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
56 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) directs the Board in determining whether a
particular activity proposed by a bank is incidental to banking to consider the benefits to the
public of the proposal, such as greater care, increased competition, or gains in efficiency. These
benefits are to be balanced against possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of re-
sources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices.
57 By traditional commercial banking the author means the operation of a place where credits
are opened by deposit or collection, subject to payment or remittance upon draft, check or order,
and where money is advanced or lent, or promissory notes received for discount or sale.
58 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1978). Generally, these activities encompass credit extension and re-
lated activities, financial management services, data processing services related to banking and
finance, and specialized courier services. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies,
92 H&Av. L. REv. 787, 797 (1979).
59 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); divestiture of interests acquired through a
debt previously contracted is regulated under 12 C.F.R. § 225.101 (1978).
60 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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The underlying purpose of the special regulation of banking orga-
nizations is to insure their soundness, so that public depositors may be
protected against the risk of bank failure. Banking organizations have
been kept separate from other lines of business primarily to help regu-
lators issue guidelines to banks as financial intermediaries. 61 However,
while administrative ease and efficiency in regulatory oversight are im-
portant objectives, the separation of business and commerce is not sac-
rosanct.62 Other means of guaranteeing the soundness of financial
institutions exist, such as controls on a banking organization's financial
exposure in an affiliated company, controls on insider misconduct, and
deposit insurance.63 Regulatory authorities should select the least re-
strictive form of regulation that still satisfies the underlying purpose for
their oversight and control. Maintenance of a barrier between banking
and commerce for the mere sake of tradition appears to be neither con-
sistent with the underlying purpose of regulatory oversight, nor appro-
priate to the international economic challenges in our non-traditional
times.
U.S. banking organizations should be allowed to participate in the
formation and operation of American trading companies. Banking or-
ganizations can offer both the substantial financial resources and the
support facilities and services which appear essential if export trading
companies are to be rapidly formed on a scale sufficient to affect overall
U.S. export levels.
Banking organizations are the principal U.S. institutions with the
capital and lending capacity needed to help organize and operate
American trading companies. The penetration of foreign markets car-
ries high overhead costs and requires long-term capital commitments.64
To bid competitively and move goods quickly, trading companies must
also have access to ready short-term capital reserves.65 While some ex-
port financing could be made available through the Export-Import
61 Clark, supra note 58, at 791.
62 Id. at 815.
63 See generally, Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.. 1 (1976).
64 For example, a single small-size trading company office in a major foreign market location
requires from three to five persons and would cost on a yearly basis, including expenses, $300,000
to $400,000. Any serious export management company requires an office in at least three to five of
the major market areas. Export Trading Company Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2379 and S. 864
Before the Subcomm on Int'l Finance of the Senate Comm on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1980) (statement of Jerry L. Hester, President, International Trade
Operations, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as ETCA Hearings].
65 Export Trading Company Legislation Hearings on H.R 7310, H.R 7364, H.R 7436, and
H. 7463 Before the Int'l Trade Subcomm. ofthe House Comm on Banking Finance and Urban
Affairs Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1980) (statement of Abraham Katz, Assistant Secretary
for International Economic Policy, Department of Commerce).
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Bank, the bulk of new export financing must come from private com-
mercial banks.66
Since the finance component of an export sale is sometimes the
most important, export trading companies must be knowledgeable in
international export financing.6 7 U.S. banking organizations already
have considerable expertise in the broad range of international export
financing options. Their participation in American trading companies
could promote the trading companies' sophistication in structuring
competitive financing options.
U.S. banking organizations also already have an extensive domes-
tic retail banking network which reaches a large number of the small
and medium sized companies that manufacture exportable products.68
This network could supply that important introductory link between
trading companies and potential American exporters which the Japa-
nese were only able to provide through reliance on loosely structured
"enterprise groups."
Many U.S. banking organizations have already developed an
overseas network of branch banks, affiliates, and foreign correspondent
banks. These firms, linked by global communication networks much
like those successfully employed by the Japanese trading companies,
now acquire detailed knowledge of local economic conditions, govern-
ment policies, foreign exchange regulations, and business practices.69
American banks could thus provide a tremendous reservoir of informa-
tion, talent and experience that would take new trading companies
years to develop on their own.7 0
66 ETCA Hearings, supra note 64, at 169 (statement of Jerry L. Hester). Adequate capital
reserves are needed, for example, by trading companies bringing together several participants on a
turnkey project export to secure needed project bid guarantee credits from banks. Id. (In a "turn-
key" export of, say, an industrial plant, the undertaking is to deliver the plant in operating condi-
tion so that the buyer need only walk up to the front door and turn the key.)
67 This fact is recognized, for example, in provisions of the Export Trading Company Act of
1980 which authorize and direct the Export-Import Bank to establish a guarantee program for
commercial loans to U.S. exporters secured by export accounts receivable or inventories of export-
able goods, but only to the extent that the Board of Directors determines that the private credit
market is not providing adequate financing. § 107. The Act also authorizes an additional $20
million per year in fiscal years 1981 through 1985 to the Economic Development Administration
and the Small Business Administration to help export trading companies meet start-up costs
through loans, guarantees and operating grants. § 106. By comparison, private bank investments
and loans to export trading companies are expected to total $1 billion within five years after
enactment of the Act. S. REP. No. 735, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980).
68 See ETCA Hearings, supra note 64, at 121 (statement of James B. Sommers, President,
Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade).
69 Id. at 120. In 1979, 139 U.S. banks had 779 foreign branches. Korth, The Evoling Role of
U.S. Banks in International Finance, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE, Jul.-Aug. 1980, at 68, 69.
70 See ETCA Hearings, supra note 64, at 121 (statement of James B. Sommers, President,
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Finally, U.S. banking organizations could encourage and help
American exporters develop a longer-term view of their presence in the
international marketplace, 71 providing the leadership which mere pas-
sive government assistance cannot.
The participation of U.S. banking organizations could thus signifi-
cantly accelerate the development, and enhance the viability of Ameri-
can trading companies. The challenge in allowing such participation
will be to balance the traditional concerns that underlie U.S. banking
laws against the capacities that American trading companies must pos-
sess in order to achieve a strengthening of the export trade of this coun-
try. This is the challenge to which the Export Trading Company Act of
1980 attempts to respond.
BANK PARTICIPATION IN EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES
The Export Trading Company Act of 1980 does not authorize
banking organizations7 2 to undertake the activities of an export trading
company directly. The Act does, however, permit banking organiza-
tions to invest up to $10 million in one or more separately incorporated
export trading companies without prior federal regulatory approval, if
the investment does not cause an export trading company to become a
subsidiary of the investing banking organization.73 Investments that
exceed the $10 million limit or that confer control of an export trading
company upon the investing banking organization 74 require prior ap-
Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade). With fewer restrictions abroad than in the U.S. on con-
ducting commercial banking operations, the overseas branches of many U.S. banks have devel-
oped special expertise in fields such as merchant banking. See Asher, Merchant Banking Is Alive
and Very Well in London, BANKING, July 1978, at 44.
71 See ETC4 Hearings, supra note 64, at 150 (statement of Erland Heginbotham, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).
72 The term includes state and national banks, federal savings banks, Edge Act and Agree-
ment corporations, bank holding companies, and "bankers' banks." § 105(a)(1). "Bankers'
banks" are banks whose stock is owned exclusively by other banks and which are engaged exclu-
sively in providing banking services for other banks and their officers, directors or employees.
§ 105(a)(5). Through "bankers' banks" a number of smaller banks can join to form an export
trading company.
73 § 105(b)(1)(A).
74 § 105(b)(1)(B). In addition to investments which cause an export trading company (ETC)
to become a subsidiary of the investing banking organization, prior regulatory approval is re-
quired for investments causing more than 50% of the voting stock of an ETC to be owned or
controlled by banking organizations. Id. The terms "contror' and "subsidiary" have the same
meaning as assigned to those terms in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-50 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). § 105(a)(12). Section 2 of the 1956 Act defines "control" as
ownership of 25% or more of the voting shares, control of a majority of the directors, or exercise of
a controlling influence. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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proval of the appropriate federal banking agency."
A banking organization's aggregate investment in export trading
companies is limited by the Act to five percent of the banking organiza-
tion's consolidated surplus and capital.76 The Act also prohibits any
banking organization from directly or indirectly investing and lending
more than ten percent of its capital surplus in or to an export trading
company.77 These limits on a banking organization's financial expo-
sure, either as an investor in or creditor of any export trading company,
apply regardless of whether the export trading company is controlled
by the investing or lending banking organization.
In addition to mechanical statutory limits on a banking organiza-
tion's investment in an export trading company, the Act empowers the
appropriate federal banking regulatory agency to order termination of
an investment in an export trading company whenever "it has reason-
able cause to believe that the ownership or control of any investment in
an export trading company constitutes a serious risk to the financial
safety, soundness or stability of the banking organization and is incon-
sistent with sound banking principles, with the purposes of the Export
Trading Company Act or with the Financial Institutions Supervisory
Act of 1966." 78 Thus, while the Act relaxes prohibitions that had kept
75 In reviewing proposals for investment in ETCs in excess of the discretionary limits, the
appropriate federal banking agency must take into consideration the financial and managerial
resources, competitive situation, and future prospects of the banking organization and ETC con-
cerned as well as the benefits of the proposal to U.S. business, industrial, and agricultural concerns
(with special emphasis on small, medium-size and minority concerns), and to U.S. competitiveness
in world markets. § 105(d)(1). A banking organization wishing either to make additional invest-
ments in ETCs, or to undertake through a subsidiary ETC a line of activity not previously ap-
proved, must give the appropriate federal banking agency 90 days prior written notice, within
which period the agency must act. § 105(b)(2). Applications by banking organizations to make a
$10 million investment or any controlling investment in an ETC must be acted upon by the appro-
priate federal banking agency within 120 days. § 105(b)(3).
76 § 105(b)(1). The limit for Edge Act and Agreement corporations not engaged in banking is
25%. Id. The 25% limit is smaller than currently provided for non-banking Edge investments
overseas under the Federal Reserve's Regulation K. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (1980). The 5% limit is the
same as currently applied to national bank investments in small business investment companies,
12 C.F.R. § 225.111 (1980), and in community development corporations. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7480
(1980). In contrast, national banks can invest in excess of 5% in safe deposit corporations, 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1980), premise companies, 12 U.S.C. § 371(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), bank service
corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1976), Edge Act and Agreement corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 618
(1976 & Supp. III 1979), and agricultural credit corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). There is no
limit on the amount a national bank can invest in Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) or Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) corporations authorized under
Title IX of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, in the Student Loan Marketing
Association, or in non-banking companies permissible under the Bank Holding Company Act. 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
77 § 105(c)(2).
78 § 105(d)(4). This broad regulatory authority to require divestiture of any ETC investment
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banks from involvement in export trading companies, the participation
that will now be permitted remains strictly controlled by statute and by
regulatory oversight.
On the Senate floor, with the support of certain federal banking
authorities,79 Senator Proxmire proposed an additional restriction lim-
iting the participation of banking organizations in export trading com-
panies to a 20% non-controlling interest.A0 Had this been approved, it
would not only have significantly tipped the balance against the forma-
tion of export trading companies, but would also have undermined the
prudential limitations in the Act designed to guarantee the soundness
of banking organizations. A controlling interest in an export trading
company does not necessarily threaten the soundness of a bank more
than a non-controlling interest. The bank's real financial exposure is
determined by the total amount of assets it has at risk in the separately
incorporated export trading company, either as equity investment or in
the form of loans, and this is already strictly controlled by the 5% and
10% capital surplus tests.8 1 The public policy of ensuring bank sound-
ness is already satisfied; controls over the affiliated export trading com-
pany's corporate governance structure do no more to limit the banking
organization's capital at risk. Indeed, limitations on a banking organi-
zation's ability to obtain control of an export trading company in which
the former's capital is at stake can actually increase the risk to the
banking organization. Relegated to a minority and non-controlling eq-
uity position, the banking organization would not be able to preclude
those export trading company activities which the bank might consider
unsound and which might lead to the export trading company's col-
lapse. Such an unfortunate scenario was recently played out in the
parallels powers over other bank holding company investments which were given to the Federal
Reserve under the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 28, 31, and 42
U.S.C.).
79 See S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of Irvine Sprague, Chairman, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation), 61 (statement of Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Gover-
nors, Federal Reserve System); S. REP. No. 735, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 34 (1980) (Letter from Paul
A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
80 Senator Proxmire's amendment was proposed Aug. 26, 1980, and defeated by voice vote,
[1980] 322 IN 'L TRADE RPT. U.S. EX1ORT WKLY. (BNA) at C-1 (Sept. 2, 1980); 323 id. at C-I.
81 It has been suggested that a banking organization's liability may extend beyond its capital
at risk if it has been providing management to an ETC or was engaged in significant intercom-
pany transactions and if creditors of a failing ETC are able to "pierce the corporate veil." S. 2718
Hearings, supra note 4, at I 1 (statement of Irvine Sprague, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation). This is a purely speculative danger. Clark, supra note 58, at 834.
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financial collapse of the Real Estate Investment Trust industry. 2 Un-
willing to be placed in such a position again, banking organizations
might forego investing in or lending to export trading companies,83 de-
priving the export trading companies of needed know-how and
financial resources.
While majority control of non-banking affiliates by banking orga-
nizations is clearly called for to ensure the formation and success of
export trading companies, it has been suggested that such control might
give rise to possible conflicts of interest and to transactions between
banks and export trading companies which are unfairly biased in favor
of one of the parties. It has been feared, for example, that ownership of
export trading companies by banking organizations would skew the lat-
ter's "arm's-length" credit judgments, and lead banks to grant loans to
export trading companies when the loans--or the trading companies-
were unsound.84 Even if ownership did not lead to impaired judgment
in granting of credit, some suggest that banking organizations will feel
compelled to rescue failing export trading companies which have come
to be identified with the banking organization and whose financial con-
dition is reflected on the banking organization's consolidated balance
sheets.
These concerns are without solid foundation, and even if poten-
tially justifiable, are adequately safeguarded against by provisions of
the Act. The Act does not suspend the numerous banking regulations
and fiduciary laws which are applicable to a banking organization's top
management. While there is the potential for insider" misconduct in
any transaction between corporate affiliates, these stringent laws and
regulations already inhibit managerial overlaps and harmful self-deal-
ing.8 6 It is unlikely that rational bank officers, whose compensation is
tied to the wisdom of their investments, would suddenly so compromise
82 See Taylor, The Financial Collapse of the REIT Industry: An Analysis and Proposed Regula-
tory Framework, 9 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 451 (1978).
83 In a similar context, in recommending that the Small Business Investment Companies Act
be amended to remove a provision which prohibited a bank from acquiring 50% or more of the
voting stock of an SBIC, the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee noted: "Al-
lowing banks to control or wholly own a license would serve to encourage financial institutions
which are interested in the sound development of the SBIC program [to invest] and would in-
crease the amount of capital available for small business investment." S. RaP. No. 420, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1976).
84 See, e.g., S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 60 (statement of Henry C. Wallich, Member,
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
85 Id. at 61.
86 In addition, the Act specifically empowers the appropriate federal banking agency, in ap-
proving applications for investments in export trading companies exceeding $10 million or confer-
ring control on the investing banking organization, to impose such conditions as it may deem
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their professional judgment that they would endanger the soundness of
their banking organizations with excessively risky loans. Still further
assurance is provided by provisions of the Act which prohibit the total
of a banking organization's historical cost of direct and indirect invest-
ment in all loans to export trading companies from exceeding ten per-
cent of the banking organization's capital and surplus,87 and explicitly
prohibit either extending credit to any export trading company in
which the banking organization holds any interest, or to customers of
such a company, on terms more favorable than those afforded other
similar borrowers in similar circumstances, or extending credit that in-
volves more than normal risks of repayment.88 Thus, the Act limits the
amount of resources a bank may commit to the rescue of a failing ex-
port trading company, and furthermore, it prevents the sort of identifi-
cation of a bank with the trading company, that would lead to a rescue
attempt.8 9 The Act, then, protects the soundness of the bank without
preventing its affiliation with an export trading company.
Another concern regarding the granting of credit by banking orga-
nizations is that bank affiliation with export trading companies will
lead to favoritism and anticompetitive tie-ins in which third parties
would be extended unsound, undue, or simply unfair credit from bank-
ing organizations in return for the purchase of commodities or services
from bank-affiliated export trading companies.g0 These fears appear to
be greatly exaggerated. With significant competition for credit and cus-
tomers in an efficient capital market, and with little evidence of sub-
stantial reciprocal dealing problems in the past, there is little to suggest
that our ordinary antitrust laws and policies could not adequately deal
with any such problems that might arise.9 1
Some Shortcomings in the Act
It must be noted, that in addition to regulating a banking organi-




89 § 105(c)(1) prohibits an ETC from using a name which is similar in any way to the name of
the investing banking organization. For a discussion of the consequences of the public confusing
the name and identity of a risky affiliate with that of the intermediary itself, see Schotland, Bank
Holding Companies and Public Policy Today, in HousE Comm. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND
HousING, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY
(FINE), COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE FINE STUDY 233, 270-77 (Comm. Print,
1976).
90 See, ag., S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of Senator Proxmire).
91 Clark, supra note 58, at 827-28.
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zation's relationship as an investor in or creditor of an export trading
company, the Export Trading Company Act places restrictions on the
operations of the non-banking export trading company itself, in-
dependent of its relations with any banking organization. For example,
the Act empowers the appropriate federal banking agencies to set stan-
dards by which any export trading company in which a banking organ-
ization has an ownership interest may take title to goods. 92 In
particular, the agencies can establish inventory-to-capital ratios for
those circumstances in which the export trading company may bear a
market risk on inventory held.93 Also, an export trading company in
which a banking organization has an ownership interest cannot take
positions in commodities or commodities contracts in securities, or in
foreign exchange, other than as may be necessary in the course of its
business operations.94 Finally, the Act defines an export trading com-
pany as a company organized and operated "principally" to export
U.S. goods and services and to facilitate their exportation by unaffili-
ated persons.95 However, the word "principally" is ambiguous and
could be read to restrict activities integral to the operation of a success-
ful export trading company, but which are not specifically related to
exporting.
By regulating the operational activities of a banking organization's
non-banking affiliates, the Act departs from its previously principled
grounds. As discussed above, the public policy of guaranteeing the
soundness of banking organizations is already served by limitations on
bank financial exposure in export trading companies. 96 The justifica-
tion for limiting the business discretion of non-financial business cor-
porations is neither as clear nor as persuasive as in the case of
regulating financial institutions which are directly entrusted with the
public's capital, and which are themselves limited in their dealings with
the corporations whose discretion appears to be the cause of concern.
The extra control sought over export trading companies is under-
standable enough in itself. For example, the limitation on an export
trading company's ability to take positions in commodities would pre-
92 § 105(d)(2). The appropriate federal banking agency may not impose standards for the
taking of title which "unnecessarily disadvantage, restrict or limit export trading companies in
competing in world markets." § 105(d)(3).
93 § 105(d)(2).
94 § 105(c)(3).
95 § 103(a)(5). An export trading company is defined as a company doing business under the
laws of the U.S. or any state and which is exclusively engaged in activities related to international
trade. § 105(a)(13). This definition does not permit export trading companies to engage in agri-
cultural production, manufacturing, or in underwriting, selling or distributing securities. Id.
96 See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
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vent traders from engaging in purely speculative activities of which
most of their investors would disapprove. However, it is in the prov-
ince and discretion of the investors to ensure that adequate internal
controls in an export trading company block activities that the investors
may consider imprudently speculative. The failure of a non-financial
business corporation is of principal concern to its shareholders. To the
degree that its shareholders may be financial corporations, they are al-
ready under regulation. While the financial health of all American
businesses is of concern to federal authorities, the federal mandate over
banking organizations is properly exercised-as in the remainder of the
Act-by limiting bank exposure in non-banking activities and by pro-
viding guidelines for the transactions between banking organizations
and their affiliates.
The potential for restricting trading company activities under the
terms of the Act "principally" to the exportation of U.S. goods97 and
the provision of export trade services98 is worrisome. As discussed
above, successful export trading companies are often involved in two-
and three-way trade, and they both import and export goods in barter
transactions.99 These complex forms of trade have become increasingly
important, and to restrict importing operations would cost the trading
companies flexibility (including the capacity to arrange transactions so
as to relieve currency deficits), would possibly close markets, and
would certainly retard the export trading companies' absorption of the
commercial experience needed to become competitive in the interna-
tional marketplace.
Many of the advantages that trading companies would offer U.S.
manufacturers in export transactions, including simplification of docu-
mentary and financial problems, are equally desirable on the import
side. Indeed, experience shows that these advantages can be most fully
exploited by traders who engage in both export and import. Trading
companies that can confidently engage in export and import would
more rapidly acquire the specialized knowledge and skills of interna-
tional commerce and would be able to achieve better and more profita-
97 U.S. goods are defined as tangible property manufactured, produced, grown or extracted in
the U.S., in which the cost of imported raw materials and components shall not exceed 50% of the
sales price. § 103(a)(2). Fifty percent was chosen because it is the existing standard in the Internal
Revenue Code for eligible "export receipts" of Domestic International Sales Corporations
(DISCs). S. REP. No. 735, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1980).
98 The term "export trade services" encompasses a wide variety of activities including consult-
ing, international market research, advertising, marketing, insurance, product research and design,
legal assistance, transportation, trade documentation, communication and processing of foreign
orders, warehousing, foreign exchange, and financing. § 103(a)(4).
99 See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
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ble use of their assets and their distribution networks. While the
legislative history of the Act clearly recognizes that the business of ex-
port trading companies "may include some domestic trade, some im-
port trade and some third-party international trade wholly outside U.S.
commerce," the meaning of "principally" is clarified nowhere in the
Act, nor are standards for the application of the term provided. 1°°
CONCLUSION
Recognition has been growing that the United States needs to ex-
port more and export better. Though our balance-of-trade troubles are
not over, our export performance in the last year has improved. 10'
Now is the time to buttress this trend, to build it into a turn-around,
and to regain our role as Yankee trader.10 2
One way to improve our exports is along the Japanese model of
general trading companies. The attractiveness of this model for us is
that it would re-allocate burdens and make use of untapped resources
with good economic sense. When traders master the skills of exporting,
an entire spectrum of manufacturers can benefit from a trade expertise
that they can afford to pay for but could not afford to develop for them-
selves. When the special expense of exporting and the requirement of
international know-how do not rest afresh on every firm that would
have its products go abroad, manufacturers can be free to make more
effective use of their capital and traders can reduce costs through effi-
ciency and economies of scale. Whatever elements of this model might
not be suitable to transport here, the general trading company is logical
and successful and worthy of our study.
The Export Trading Company Act of 1980 attempts to meet the
issue of our export needs. It would allow banks to support trading
companies while still calling for compliance with the regulatory guide-
lines that protect the interest of the public. Banking organizations are
100 S. RaP. No. 735, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1980). The Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, in its report on S. 2718 stated that under § 103(5) a "presumption is estab-
lished that on the average at least one-half of the company's total business... will be directly
related to U.S. exports which must contain at least 50 per cent value attributable to the U.S." Id.
Another standard, suggested by witnesses in the hearings for the Act, would measure the percent-
age of gross or net earnings of an export trading company generated directly in export trade. See,
e.g., S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 103 (statement of Robert L. McCormick).
101 There are many reasons besides the balance of trade to strengthen our export performance.
The President's Export Council has suggested fourteen, including reinforcing the dollar, providing
industry with new incentives to innovation and productivity, preventing self-defeating protection-
ist measures, and, not least, opening new jobs. Bus. AMERiCA, Dec. 1, 1980, at 9. But the impor-
tance of a trade balance should not be discounted.
102 Bus. WEEK, June 30, 1980 (special issue), at 134.
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the best point of departure for this new form of enterprise. They al-
ready have the global reach and the financial strength that trading
companies will need. The Act, for the most part, takes intelligent steps
that would encourage trading companies to take root and grow. When
the Act falls short, it is in certain provisions that unnecessarily interfere
with business judgment in pursuit of public policy objectives that have
already been secured. These provisions, though few, digress from the
main design of the Act.
The supporters of this bill should be commended for their appreci-
ation of international trade. The establishment of American trading
companies, with their capacity for skill, economy, and the effective in-
clusion of average-sized businesses, should invigorate our exports to
the benefit of ourselves and our trading partners throughout the world.
